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ABSTRACT 
Numerous security metrics have been proposed in the past for protecting computer networks.  However 
we still lack effective techniques to accurately measure the predictive security risk of an enterprise taking 
into account the dynamic attributes associated with vulnerabilities that can change over time. In this 
paper we present a stochastic security framework for obtaining quantitative measures of security using 
attack graphs. Our model is novel as existing research in attack graph analysis do not consider the 
temporal aspects associated with the vulnerabilities, such as the availability of exploits and patches 
which can affect the overall network security based on how the vulnerabilities are interconnected and 
leveraged to compromise the system. Gaining a better understanding of the relationship between 
vulnerabilities and their lifecycle events can provide security practitioners a better understanding of their 
state of security. In order to have a more realistic representation of how the security state of the network 
would vary over time, a nonhomogeneous model is developed which incorporates a time dependent 
covariate, namely the vulnerability age. The daily transition-probability matrices are estimated using 
Frei's Vulnerability Lifecycle model. We also leverage the trusted CVSS metric domain to analyze how 
the total exploitability and impact measures evolve over a time period for a given network. 
KEYWORDS 
Attack Graph, Non-homogeneous Markov Model, Markov Reward Models, CVSS, Security Evaluation, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Defending a large scale enterprise from outside threats is a fairly complicated task. At the same 
time, Cybercriminals are increasingly using sophisticated social engineering techniques leading 
to disruptions in business operations, damaging the reputation as well as financial stability of 
these corporations. The recent cyber-attack incident at Target Corp illustrates how these security 
breaches can seriously affect profits and shareholder value. According to a report by Secunia[1], 
the number of reported security vulnerabilities in 2013 increased by 32% compared to 2012. 
However in spite of these increasing rate of attacks on corporate and government systems, 
corporations have fallen behind on ramping up their defenses due to limited budgets as well as 
weak security practices.  
One of the main challenges currently faced in the field of security measurement is to develop a 
mechanism to aggregate the security of all the systems in a network in order assess the overall 
security of the network. For example INFOSEC [2] has identified security metrics as being one 
of the top 8 security research priorities. Similarly Cyber Security IT Advisory Committee [3] 
has also identified this area to be among the top 10 security research priorities. 
In addition, traditional security efforts in corporations have focused on protecting key assets 
against known threats which have been disclosed publicly. But today, advanced attackers are 
developing exploits for vulnerabilities that have not yet been disclosed called “zero-day” 
exploits. So it is necessary for security teams to focus on activities that are beyond expected or 
pre-defined.  By building appropriate stochastic models and understanding the relationship 
between vulnerabilities and their lifecycle events, it is possible to predict the future when it 
comes to cybercrime such as identifying vulnerability trends, anticipating security gaps in the 
network, optimizing resource allocation decisions and ensuring the protection of key corporate 
assets in the most efficient manner. 
In this paper, we propose a stochastic model for security evaluation based on Attack Graphs, 
taking into account the temporal factors associated with vulnerabilities that can change over 
time. By providing a single platform and using a trusted open vulnerability scoring framework 
such as CVSS[4-6], it is possible to visualize the current as well as future security state of the 
network leading to actionable knowledge. Several well established approaches for Attack graph 
analysis [7-15] have been proposed using probabilistic analysis as well as graph theory to 
measure the security of a network. Our model is novel as existing research in attack graph 
analysis do not consider the temporal factors associated with the vulnerabilities, such as the 
availability of exploits and patches. In this paper, a nonhomogeneous model is developed which 
incorporates a time dependent covariate, namely the vulnerability age. The proposed model can 
help identify critical systems that need to be hardened based on the likelihood of being intruded 
by an attacker as well as risk to the corporation of being compromised.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss about previous 
research proposed for security metrics and quantification. In Section 3, we explore the Cyber-
Security Analytics Framework and then realize a non-homogenous Markov Model for security 
evaluation that is capable of analyzing the evolving exploitability and impact measures of a 
given network. In Section 4, we present the results of our analysis with an example. Finally, we 
conclude the paper in Section 5. 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Here we briefly discuss about Attack Graphs and then provide an overview of some of the most 
prominent works that have been proposed for quantifying security in a network. 
              
Figure 1.  Security Metric Classification 
 
 
2.1. Attack Graph 
Computer attacks have been graphically modeled since the late 1980s by the US DoD as 
discussed in their paper [16]. Most of the attack modeling performed by analysts was 
constructed by hand and hence it was a tedious and error-prone process especially if the number 
of nodes were very large. In 1994 Dacier et al [17] published one of the earliest mathematical 
models for a security system based on privilege graphs. By the late 1990's a couple of other 
papers [18, 19] came out which enabled automatic generation of attack graphs using computer 
aided tools. In [18] the authors describes a method of modeling network risks based on an attack 
graph where each node in the graph represented an attack state and the edges represented a 
transition or a change of state caused by an action of the attacker. Since then researchers have 
proposed a variety of graph-based algorithms to generate attack graphs for security evaluation.  
2.2. Classes of Security 
There are different classes under which network security metrics fall under. These classes are 
depicted in Fig 1. Here are some examples of metrics that fall under each category. 
2.2.1. Core Metrics  
A few examples that fall under this category are Total Vulnerability Measure (TVM) [20] and 
Langweg Metric (LW) [21]. TVM is the aggregation of two other metrics called the Existing 
Vulnerabilities Measure (EVM) and the Aggregated Historical Vulnerability Measure (AHVM). 
CVSS [4-5] is an open standard for scoring IT security vulnerabilities. It was developed to 
provide organizations with a mechanism to measure vulnerabilities and prioritize their 
mitigation. For example the US Federal government uses the CVSS standard as the scoring 
engine for its National Vulnerability database (NVD) [6] which has a repository of over forty-
five thousand known vulnerabilities and is updated on an ongoing basis 
2.2.2. Structural Metrics  
These metrics use the underlying structure of the Attack graph to aggregate the security 
properties of individual systems in order to quantify network security. The Shortest Path (SP) 
[18], [7] metric measures the shortest path for an attacker to reach an end goal. The Number of 
Paths (NP) [7] metric measures the total number of paths for an attacker to reach the final goal. 
The Mean of Path Lengths (MPL) metric [8] measures the arithmetic mean of the length of all 
paths to the final goal in an attack graph. The above structural metrics have shortcomings and in 
[9], Idika et al have proposed a suite of attack graph based security metrics to overcome some of 
these inherent weaknesses. In [22], Ghosh et al provides an analysis and comparison of all the 
existing structural metrics. 
2.2.3. Probability-Based Metrics  
These metrics associate probabilities with individual entities to quantify the aggregated security 
state of the network. A few examples that fall under this category are Attack Graph-based 
Probabilistic (AGP) and Bayesian network (BN) based metrics [23-25]. 
2.2.4. Time-Based Metrics 
These metrics quantify how fast a network can be compromised or how quickly a network can 
take preemptive measures to respond to attacks. Common metric that fall in this category are 
Mean Time to Breach (MTTB), Mean Time to Recovery (MTTR) [26] and Mean Time to First 
Failure (MTFF) [27].  
The drawback with all these classes of metrics is that they take a more static approach to 
security analysis and do not leverage the granularity provided by the CVSS metric framework in 
order to assess overall dynamic security situation and help locate critical nodes for optimization 
 
2.3. Vulnerability Lifecycle Models 
Presently, there is research [28-31] on analyzing the evolution of life cycle of different types of 
vulnerabilities. Frei et al. [31] in particular developed a distribution model to calculate the 
likelihood of an exploit or patch being available a certain number of days after its disclosure 
date. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has been done to analyze overall security 
of a network, by considering the temporal relationships between all the vulnerabilities that are 
present in the network, which can be exploited by an attacker. 
2.4. Cyber Situation Awareness 
Tim Bass [32] first introduced the concept of cyberspace situation awareness and built a 
framework for it which laid the foundation for subsequent research in Network Security 
Situational Awareness [33]. The drawback with most of these NSSA models is that they don't 
adopt a consistent integrated framework for describing the relationships between the 
vulnerabilities in the network nor do they use an open scoring framework such as CVSS for 
analyzing the dynamic attributes of a vulnerability using stochastic modeling techniques. 
3. CYBER-SECURITY ANALYTICS FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Figure 2.  Cyber Security Analytics Framework 
In this section, we explore the concept of modeling the Attack graph as a stochastic process. In 
[40, 41], we established the cyber-security analytics framework (Figure 2) where we have 
captured all the processes involved in building our security metric framework. In this paper we 
will extend the model by taking into account the temporal aspects associated with the individual 
vulnerabilities. By capturing their interrelationship using Attack Graphs, we can predict how the 
total security of the network changes over time. The fundamental assumption we make in our 
model is that the time-parameter plays an important role in capturing the progression of the 
attack process. Markov model is one such modeling technique that has been widely used in a 
variety of areas such as system performance analysis and dependability analysis [11, 27, 42-43]. 
While formulating the stochastic model, we need to take into account the behavior of the 
attacker. In this paper, we assume that the attacker will choose the vulnerability that maximizes 
his or her probability of succeeding in compromising the security goal 
3.1. Architecture 
Figure 3 shows a high level view of our proposed cyber security analytics architecture 
which comprises of 4 layers.  
 
         
Figure 3.  Cyber Security Analytics Architecture 
The core component of our architecture is the Attack Graph Model (Layer 1) which is generated 
using a network model builder by taking as input network topology, services running on each 
host and a set of attack rules based on the vulnerabilities associated with the different services. 
The underlying metric domain is provided by the trusted CVSS framework (Layer 2) which 
quantifies the security attributes of individual vulnerabilities associated with the attack graph. 
We divide our security analysis by leveraging two CVSS metric domains. One captures the 
exploitability characteristics of the network and the other analyzes the impact a successful 
attack can have on a corporations key assets. We believe that both these types of analysis are 
necessary for a security practitioner to gain a better understanding of the overall security of the 
network. In layer 3, relevant stochastic processes are applied over the Attack Graph to describe 
the attacks by taking into account the relationships between the different vulnerabilities in a 
system. For example, in our approach, we utilize an Absorbing Markov chain for performing 
exploitability analysis and a Markov Reward Model for Impact analysis. In [40, 41] we 
discussed how we can model an attack-graph as a discrete time absorbing Markov chain where 
the absorbing state represents the security goal being compromised. 
So far we have been focusing on the security properties that are intrinsic to a particular 
vulnerability and that doesn’t change with time. These measures are calculated from the CVSS 
Base metric group which aggregates several security properties to formulate the base score for a 
particular vulnerability.  In order to account for the dynamic/temporal security properties of the 
vulnerability, we apply a Vulnerability Lifecycle model (Layer 4) on the stochastic process to 
identify trends and understand how the security state of the network will evolve with time. 
Security teams can thus analyze how availability of exploits and patches can affect the overall 
network security based on how the vulnerabilities are interconnected and leveraged to 
compromise the system. We believe that such a framework also facilitates communication 
between security engineers and business stakeholders and aids in building an effective cyber-
security analytics strategy.  
3.2. Model Representation 
In [40, 41] we have discussed how we can model an attack-graph as a discrete time absorbing 
Markov chain due to the following two properties.  
1. An attack graph has at least one absorbing state or goal state. 
2. In an attack graph it is possible to go from every state to an absorbing state. 
We also presented a formula for calculating the transition probabilities of the Markov chain by 
normalizing the CVSS exploitability scores over all the transitions starting from the attacker’s 
source state. In this paper, we will extend the model to analyze and measure two key aspects. 
First, we take into account both the exploitability as well impact properties associated with a 
security goal being compromised. By considering both these measures separately, we can derive 
a complementary suite of metrics to aid the security engineer in optimizing their decisions. 
Second we combine the temporal trends associated with the individual vulnerabilities into the 
model to reason about the future security state of the network. In our model we will calculate 
the daily transition-probability matrices using the well-established Frei's Vulnerability lifecycle 
model [31]. 
The security of the network is dependent on the exploitability level of the different 
vulnerabilities associated with the services running on the machines in the enterprise. In 
addition the security metrics will dynamically vary based on the temporal aspects of the 
vulnerabilities taken into consideration. As an example, consider CVE-2014-0416 which is an 
unspecified vulnerability in Oracle Java SE related to the Java Authentication and Authorization 
Service (JAAS) component. We define the base exploitability score 𝑒(𝑣) as the measure of 
complexity in exploiting the vulnerability 𝑣. The CVSS standard provides a framework for 
computing these scores using the access vector (𝐴𝑉), access complexity (𝐴𝐶) and 
authentication (𝐴𝑢) as follows 
𝑒(𝑣) = 20 ×  𝐴𝑉 × 𝐴𝐶 × 𝐴𝑢            (1) 
The constant 20 represents the severity factor of the vulnerability. The access vector, 
authentication and access complexity for this vulnerability CVE-2014-0416 is 1.0, 0.704 and 
0.71 respectively. Therefore the base exploitability score of CVE-2014-0416 is 10.0 which 
indicate that it has very high exploitability. As of this writing the state of exploitability for this 
vulnerability is documented as “Unproven” which indicate that no exploit code is available. 
Hence it has a temporal weight score of 0.85.  Given the base exploitability score and the 
temporal weight, the effective temporal exploitability score is as follows 
                   𝑒(𝑣𝑡) = 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 × 𝑒(𝑣)             (2)                              
The temporal exploitability score for CVE-2014-0416 is 8.5. As the vulnerability ages and 
exploit code become readily availability to exploit the vulnerability, the value of the 
exploitability score will move closer towards its base value. As a comparison, consider CVE-
2012-0551 which is another unspecified vulnerability in Oracle Java SE that has a base 
exploitability score of 8.6 which is lower than CVE-2014-0416. However the state of 
exploitability for this vulnerability is documented as “High” which indicates that exploit code is 
widely available. Hence it has a temporal weight score of 1. Therefore CVE-2012-0551 is 
considered more exploitable than CVE-2014-0416 even though it has a lower base metric score 
because we have factored in the lifecycle of the vulnerability.  
The transition matrix for an absorbing Markov chain has the following Canonical form.  
   𝑃 =  [
𝑄 𝑅
0 𝐼
] 
Here P is the transition matrix, R is the matrix of absorbing states, and Q is the matrix of 
transient states.  The set of states, S in the model represent the different vulnerabilities 
associated with services running on the nodes that are part of the network. The transition 
probability matrix P of the Markov chain was estimated using the formula 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) =   
𝑒(𝑣𝑗)
∑ 𝑒(𝑣𝑘)
𝑛
𝑘=1
                 (3) 
where pij is the probability that an attacker currently in state i exploits a vulnerability e(vj)  in 
state j and e(vj)  is the exploitability score for vulnerability vj obtained from the CVSS Base 
Metric group. Further, each row of P is a probability vector, which requires that  
∑ 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 
 In an absorbing Markov chain the probability that the chain will be absorbed is always 1. 
Hence  
                         𝑄𝑛 → 0 𝑎𝑠 𝑛 → ∝ 
where Q is the matrix of transient states. Therefore for an absorbing Markov chain 𝑃(𝑚), we can 
derive a matrix 𝑁 = (𝐼 − 𝑄)−1 = 𝐼 + 𝑄 + 𝑄2 + 𝑄3 + ⋯ which is called the fundamental 
matrix for 𝑃(𝑚). This matrix N provides considerable insight into the behavior of an attacker 
who is trying to penetrate the network. The elements of the fundamental matrix nij describe the 
expected number of times the chain is in state j, given that the chain started in state i. 
3.3. Non-homogenous model 
The temporal weight score that we considered in the example above was a function of the time 
since the vulnerability was disclosed on a publicly trusted SIP (Security Information Providers). 
The temporal values recorded by CVSS are discrete and are not suitable for inclusion in a non-
homogenous model. It would be more appropriate to use a distribution that would take as input 
the age of the vulnerability. Therefore we will use the result of Frei’s model [31] to calculate the 
temporal weight score of the vulnerabilities that is part of the Attack graph model. The 
probability that an exploit is available for a given vulnerability is obtained using a Pareto 
distribution of the form: 
       𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − (
𝑘
𝑡
)
𝑎
                (4) 
a = 0.26, k = 0.00161 
where t is the age of vulnerability and the parameter k is called the shape factor. The age t is 
calculated by taking the difference between the dates the CVSS scoring is conducted and when 
the vulnerability was first disclosed on an SIP.  By combining this distribution in our model, we 
can get a more realistic estimate of the security of the network based on the age of the different 
vulnerabilities which are still unpatched in the enterprise.  
In the non-homogenous Markov model presented here, we consider the following time 
dependent covariate which is the age of the vulnerability. In order to have a more realistic 
model, we update this covariate every day for each of the vulnerabilities present in the network 
and recalculate the discrete time transition probability matrix P. Given the exploitability scores 
for each of the vulnerabilities in the Attack Graph, we can estimate the transition probabilities of 
the Absorbing Markov chain by normalizing the exploitability scores over all the edges starting 
from the attacker’s source state.  Let pij be the probability that an attacker currently in state i 
exploits a vulnerability in state j. We can then formally define the transition probability below 
where n is the number of outgoing edges from state i in the attack model and ej is the temporal 
exploitability score for the vulnerability in state j. 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) =   
𝑒(𝑣𝑡)𝑗
∑ 𝑒(𝑣𝑡)𝑙
𝑛
𝑙=1
                           (5) 
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒(𝑣𝑡) = (1 − (
𝑘
𝑡
)
𝑎
) × 𝑒(𝑣)     (6)     
The matrix 𝑃(𝑚) represents the transition probability matrix of the Absorbing Markov chain 
computed on day m where, p (i, j) ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ S. In an absorbing Markov chain the 
probability that the chain will be absorbed is always 1. Further, each row of 𝑃(𝑚) is a 
probability vector, which requires that  
 
∑ 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 
 
In equation (5), we use the result of Frei’s Vulnerability Lifecycle model [31] to calculate the 
temporal weight score of the vulnerabilities that is part of the Attack graph model. Therefore by 
calculating the individual temporal scores of the vulnerabilities and by analyzing their causal 
relationships using an Attack Graph, we can integrate the effect of temporal score to derive the 
total dynamic security of network. 
3.4. Exploitability Analysis 
We present quantitative analysis using our cyber security analytics model. The focus of our 
analysis will on assessing the evolving security state of the network. 
3.4.1 Expected Path length (EPL) metric 
This metric measures the expected number of steps the attacker will have to take starting from 
the initial state to compromise the security goal. Using the Fundamental matrix N of the non-
homogenous Markov model, we can compute the expected number of steps before the chain 
goes to the absorbed state. For example let ti be the expected number of steps before the chain is 
absorbed, given that the chain starts in state si, and let t be the column vector whose i
th
 entry is ti. 
Then 
𝑡 = 𝑁𝑐 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 𝑐𝑗 𝑖𝑠 1 
This security metric is analyzing the expected number of steps or the resistance of the network. 
3.4.2 Probabilistic Path (PP) metric 
This metric measures the likelihood of an attacker to reach the absorbing states of the graph. For 
this we will calculate the following matrix B where 𝐵 = 𝑁𝑅 where N is the fundamental Matrix 
of the Markov chain and R is obtained from the Canonical form. The element bij in the matrix 
measure the probability of reaching the security goal state j given that the attacker started in 
state i. The Probabilistic Path (PP) metric also aids the security engineer in making decisions 
on optimizing the network and we will label this as the Probabilistic Path (PP) metric. 
3.4. Impact Analysis 
The CVSS standard provides a framework for computing the impact associated with an 
individual vulnerability 𝑣 using confidentiality impact (𝐶), integrity impact (𝐼) and availability 
impact (𝐴) measures as follows 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝑣) = 10.41 ∗ (1 − (1 − 𝐶) ∗ (1 − 𝐼) ∗ (1 − 𝐴) 
By associating the individual impact/reward scores with each state in our Markov chain, we can 
extend the underlying stochastic process as a discrete-time Markov reward model (MRM). 
Given our existing DTMC model, we can represent the Markov Reward process as (𝜌, 𝑆, 𝑃) 
where (𝑆, 𝑃) is a DMTC and 𝜌 is a reward function for each state. Since we are considering 
only constant rewards or impact scores, the reward function can be represented as a vector 
𝑟 =  [(𝜌(𝑠1), … 𝜌(𝑠𝑛)]. Hence the expected impact at time t is given as 
∑ 𝜌(𝑠𝑖). 𝑃{𝑋(𝑡) = 
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑠𝑖} = 𝑟. 𝑥(𝑡) = 𝑟. 𝑃
𝑡 . 𝑥(0) 
This value will be termed as the Expected Impact Metric (EI). A non-homogenous MRM can 
be built by incorporating the temporal trend of individual vulnerabilities given their age. Hence 
by formulating daily transition probability matrices using Frei’s model we can reason about how 
the expected cost of breaching a security goal can vary over time. 
4. ILLUSTRATION 
To illustrate the proposed approach in detail, a network similar to [10, 24-25, 44-45] has been 
considered (refer Figure 4).  
              
                                            Figure 4.  Network Topology 
The network is comprised of 4 machines that are interconnected together and operating 
internally behind a firewall. The machine hosting the web-server M1 is running Apache 
Webserver. The aim of the attacker is to infiltrate the network and gain root access on M4. In 
order to accomplish this, the attacker needs to first start with exploiting the apache web-service 
since that is the only port (80) accessible from the firewall. Once this is exploited, the attacker 
will then need to slowly work his way through the network to achieve his goal.  
4.1. Environment Information 
Table 1 contains a list of all the vulnerabilities in the network that can be exploited by an 
attacker if certain conditions are met.  
 
Table 1.  Vulnerability Data. 
Service Name CVE-ID 
Exploitability 
Subscore 
 
Host 
 
Disclosure Date 
apache CVE-2014-0098 10.0 M1 03/18/2014 
postgresql CVE-2014-0063 7.9 M2 02/17/2014 
linux CVE-2014-0038 3.4 M3 02/06/2014 
ms-office CVE-2013-1324 8.6 M3 11/13/2013 
bmc CVE-2013-4782 10 M4 07/08/2013 
radius CVE-2014-1878 10 M4 02/28/2014 
 
Each of the six vulnerabilities is unique and publicly known and is denoted by a CVE (Common 
Vulnerability and Exposure) identifier. For example Apache web-server was found to have 
vulnerability CVE-2014-0098 on 03/18/2014 which allows remote attackers to cause 
segmentation faults. Similarly the postgresql service hosted by M2 had a vulnerability denoted 
by CVE-2014-0063 which allowed remote attackers to execute arbitrary code. 
4.2. Attack Graph Generation 
By combining the vulnerabilities present in the network configuration (Figure 4), we can build 
several scenarios whereby an attacker can reach a goal state. In this particular case, the 
attacker's goal state would be to obtain root access on Machine M4. Figure 5 depicts the 
different paths an attacker can take to reach the goal state. By combining these different paths 
we are able to obtain an Attack Graph. A couple of practical approaches have been proposed 
[44- 46] to automate generation of attack graphs without the intervention of a red team. In [47] 
the authors have compared and analyzed several open source AG tools like MulVal, TVA, 
Attack Graph Toolkit, NetSPA as well as commercial tools from aspects of scalability and 
degree of attack graph visualization. Table 2 provides an overview of the different available AG 
toolkits.                                                         
 
                                            Figure 5.  Network Topology 
In our analysis we have used the MulVAL tool discussed in [45] to generate logical attack graph 
in polynomial time. 
 
Table 2.  Attack Graph Toolkits 
Toolkit Name Complexity 
Open 
Source 
 
Developer 
MulVAL O(n
2
) ~ O(n
3
) yes Kansas State University 
TVA O(n
2
) no George Mason University 
Cauldron O(n
2
) no Commercial 
NetSPA O(nlogn) no MIT 
Firemon O(nlogn) no Commercial 
 
4.3. Security Analysis 
In the analysis, we first investigate how the distribution of our proposed attack graph metrics 
vary over a given time period. In the attack graph model, each node corresponds to a software 
related vulnerability that exists on a particular machine in the network. The transition 
probability for a particular edge in the attack graph is calculated by normalizing the CVSS 
Exploitability scores over all the edges from the attacker’s source node. By formulating an 
Absorbing Markov chain over the Attack graph and applying the Vulnerability lifecycle model 
to the exploitability scores, we are able to project how these metrics will change in the 
immediate future.  
Figure 6 (a, b, c) depicts the distribution of our proposed attack graph metrics (EPL, 
Probabilistic Path & Expected Impact) over a period of 150 days. The general trend for the 
Expected Path Length (EPL) metric (Fig 6a) is upward over the next 150 days which signifies 
that it will take fewer steps (less effort) for an attacker to compromise the security goal as the 
vulnerabilities in the network age. This visualization graph is very useful for security 
practitioners for optimizing patch management processes in the organization. By establishing 
thresholds for these metrics, the security teams can plan in advance as to when to patch a system 
versus working on an ad-hoc basis. For example, the organization may have a threshold score of 
4.86 for the EPL metric. From the graph (Fig 6a), the team can reasonably conclude that the 
systems in their network are safe from exploits breaching the security goal for the next 50 days 
as the EPL score is above the threshold value. The thresholds values are typically set by the 
security team based on how fast they can respond to a breach once it is detected.  
The Probability Path (PP) distribution (Fig 6b) which signifies the likelihood of an attacker 
compromising the security goal follows a different trend where it is seen reducing during the 
first few days and then picks up gradually with time. As vulnerabilities age, exploits become 
readily available for vulnerabilities which leads to an increase in their CVSS exploitability 
scores. As a result the transitions probabilities in the model will change likely causing other 
attack paths in the tree to become more favorable to the attacker. In the figure, we see that the 
probability of reaching the security goal tapers off after 50 days. The Expected Impact metric 
(Fig 6c) or cost of an attack to the business reduces with time and this is an indication that the 
attacker will likely choose a different path due to more exploits being available for other 
vulnerabilities that have a lower impact score. It is important to note that every organization has 
a network configuration that is very unique to their operations and therefore the distribution for 
our proposed attack graph metrics will be different for each of these configurations. 
 
Figure 6.  Network Topology 
4.4. Simulation 
Based on the Attack Graph generated for the network, a simulation of the Absorbing Markov 
chain is conducted. In our experiment we model an attacker and simulate over 2000 different 
instances of attacks over the Attack Graph based on the probability distribution of the nodes. 
We used the R statistic package [48] to generate the model and run the simulations.  
The transition probabilities are formulated from the CVSS scoring framework as described in 
section 3. Each simulation run uses the transition probability row vector of the Absorbing 
Markov Chain to move from one state to another until it reaches the final absorbing state. Figure 
6d depicts a multi-bar graph of the distribution of attack path lengths X1, X2 ….. X2000 from 2000 
simulated attack paths where the security goal was compromised. Each of the colors indicates 
the trend forecast over different periods of time. For example, in this distribution model, the 
length of the attack paths with the most frequency is 3, given the current age of all the 
vulnerabilities (shown in green). However as the vulnerabilities in the network age over a period 
of 300 days, the length of the paths with most frequency gets updated to 4 (shown in red). We 
also notice that the frequency of paths of length 3 and 5 decreases gradually over 300 days.  
Similarly Figure 6e depicts a multi-bar graph of the distribution of the state visits for the Attack 
Graph for all the 2000 instances of attack paths that were simulated using the non-homogenous 
Markov chain model. This graph represents the number of times the attacker is likely to visit a 
particular state/node in the attack graph over those 2000 simulated runs. Based on the 
simulation results depicted in Fig 6e, if we were to exclude the start state (1) and the absorbing 
state (10), we can find that an attacker is most likely to visit state 2 and least likely to visit state 
6. Hence from Table 1, we can conclude that the attacker is most likely to exploit the 
vulnerability of the bmc service running on M4 (State 2) and least likely to exploit the linux 
service on M3 (State 6). This information is valuable for a security engineer to prioritize which 
exploit needs to be patched and how it will affect the strength of the network against attacks. 
This insight is further enriched when we also consider the trends over a period of 300 days. For 
example, in Fig 6e there is an upward trend in the expected number of times the attacker visits 
state 4, while there is a downward trend for state 5 during the same time. Hence if the security 
engineer had to decide whether to patch node 4 or node 5 during this time period, it would make 
more sense to patch node 4 since it is most susceptible to an outside attack in the future. 
One the major challenges when performing patch management is timing when to install patches 
and which patches have priority. By analyzing the trends over time of how the security state of a 
network changes, a security engineer can make a more informed and intelligent decision on 
optimizing the application of patches, thereby strengthening the current as well as the future 
security state of the enterprise. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we presented a non-homogenous Markov model for quantitative assessment of 
security attributes using Attack graphs. Since existing metrics have potential short-comings for 
accurately quantifying the security of a system with respect to the age of the vulnerabilities, our 
framework aids the security engineer to make a more realistic and objective security evaluation 
of the network. What sets our model apart from the rest is the use of the trusted CVSS 
framework and the incorporation of a well-established Vulnerability lifecycle framework, to 
comprehend and analyze both the evolving exploitability and impact trends of a given network 
using Attack Graphs. We used a realistic network to analyze the merits of our model to capture 
security properties and optimize the application of patches.  
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